Torts -- Forms of Action -- Trespass -- Battery or Negligence by Anderson, Robert M.
I00 LAW JOURNAL- DECEMBER, 1939
lessee a party to the foreclosure proceedings, since such application again
involves employing a rule which has its basis in the protection of the
rights of the party against whose interest it is utilized. Hardship might
be worked against the lessee as in the case of Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Company v. Childs9 where the lessee, in reliance upon a fore-
closure proceeding to which he was made a party, vacated the premises,
only to find later that the mortgagee had withdrawn his name as a
party to the foreclosure shortly before the actual sale.
In Curry v. Bacharach Quality Shops Inc.,2" the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania held that by force of the operation of a statute2" of that
state, the purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure had the option of affirm-
ing or disaffirming a subsequent lease, but, having once affirmed the
lease he stood in the position of assignee of the reversion and could not
subsequently disavow the lease. By statute22 the interests of the lessee
are also protected so that he cannot be dispossessed unless the mortgagee-
purchaser makes him a party to the foreclosure (scire facias in Pennsyl-
vania)." The Pennsylvania solution appears to the writer to be a happy
one. It is definite in that it confers upon one party, the purchaser, the
right and obligation of determining whether or not the lease shall con-
tinue in effect; and at the same time it protects the lessee from eviction
where he has not been notified of the disaffirmance of the lease.
D. A. W.
TORTS
TORTS -F ORMS OF ACTION - TRESPASS - BATTERY
OR NEGLIGENCE
A sheriff was pursuing an escaping misdemeanant who had previ-
ously been arrested by him. While engaged in the pursuit the sheriff
fired several shots intending to frighten the misdemeanant into stop-
ping; one of the bullets struck the plaintiff, a bystander in the public
street. The Court of Appeals for the Third District held the sheriff
liable to such person saying that the sheriff "commits an act of trespass
against the person so injured."'
At early common law an action in trespass could be maintained
whenever the injury was direct and with force. Hence, an action could
be maintained in trespass if the plaintiff could prove that the defendant
"e Supra, note 5.
21 271 Pa. 364, 117 Atl. 435 (92).
2122 P.S., Sec. 2611 (1836).
12 i P.S., Sec. 309 (i9oi).
23 Nevil v. Heinke, 2z Pa. Super. 614 (1903).
"Young v. Kelly, 6o Ohio App. 382, zi N.E. (zd) 6oz (938).
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hit him.2 After the decision in Brown v. Kendall,' however, the courts
have generally agreed that, in addition to showing the act and the injury,
the plaintiff must show either a wrongful intent4 or a lack of due care.'
In other words the problem would seem to be clarified by saying that
the plaintiff must establish a battery or make out a cause of action in
negligence.
In order to establish a battery the plaintiff must show a wrongful
intent which may be shown by proving that the intended act was with-
out justification.' If the sheriff had been attempting to retake an escap-
ing felon the shooting would have been justified and the plaintiff could
not have maintained a battery.' But where, as in the principal case, the
individual attempting to escape was merely a misdemeanant, the courts
generally agree that the sheriff is not authorized to shoot.' Therefore,
had the sheriff shot the misdemeanant it would have been battery as to
him because the intended act was unlawful, thus fulfilling the require-
ment of wrongful intent. And if he aimed at the misdemeanant and
hit the plaintiff, a bystander, the law is clear that this would constitute a
battery as to the plaintiff.' But the defendant in the principal case
claimed that he did not intend to hit the misdemeanant, urging that
officers often shoot into the air to compel fugitives to stop. If this were
a lawful practice no action could be maintained for a battery, and no
action at all could be maintained if the defendant was in the exercise of
due care.'" However, the courts generally agree that this practice is
unlawful and that there is no justification for shooting at all in such a
case." Accordingly, if the sheriff fires intending merely to frighten the
" Weaver v. Ward, K.B. 1616, Hobart 134; Murphy v. Wilson, 44 Mo. 313, 100
Am. Dec. Rep. z9o (xS69).
' 6o Mass. 292 (8 go).
'Alohr v. Williams, 9S Minn. 261, 104 N.W. i2 (9o5); Vosburg v. Pitney, So
Wis. 523, So N.W. 403, 14 L.R.A. 2z6, 27 Am. St. Rep. 47 (1891).
' Welch v. Durand, 36 Conn. 182, 4 Am. Rep. 55 (1869); Shaw v. Lord, 41 Okla.
347, 137 Pac. 885 (1914).
' 'oslurg v. Pitney, supra, note 45 Booker v. Trainer, 172 Mo. App. 376, 157 S.W.
848 (1913).
"Askay v. Maloney, 92 Or. 566, 179 Pac. 899 (i919); Cook v. Hunt, 178 Okla.
477, 63 P. (2d) 693 (1936).
' "After the arrest has been made, if the misdemeanant breaks away and flees, the
rule is the same as in case of flight before arrest, that the officer may not shoot or kill to
-top the flight." 3 A.L.R. 1174. Accord: Risher v. Mfeeham, 1i Ohio C.C. 403, 5 Ohio
C.D. 416 (8896) (concedes); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 859, 22 S.V. (2d)
599 (1930)i Lane v. Butler, 225 Ill. App. 382 (1922)i Conrrady v. People, 5 Park.
Crim. Rep. 234 (N. Y., 1862)i Commonwealth v. Loughhead, 218 Pa. 429, 82o Am. St.
Rep. 896, 67 At. 747 (1907).
' Talmadge v. Smith, toi Mich. 370, 59 N.V. 656, 45 Am. St. Rep. 414 (1894);
Bannister v. Mitchell, 127 Va. 578, 104. S.E. 800 (8920).
o Shaw v. Lord, supra, note 5; Welch v. Durand, supra, note S.
X A custom of police officers to fire as a ruse to frighten fugitives into stopping is a
reckless use of firearms, and is heartily condemned. State v. Cunningham, 107 Miss. 140,
6S So. ix5 (1914). Accord: Mangino v. Todd, et al., ig Ala. App. 486, 98 So. 323
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fugitive, it would constitute a battery as to the fugitive if he were hit,
and if a bystander were hit it would be a battery as to him.'
The result in the principal case would seem to be justified also upon
the ground of negligence. Firearms are recognized by the courts as
dangerous instruments,1" and it has been generally agreed that a high
standard of care should be required of anyone using them. 4 That
standard has been determined by some courts to be a "great" degree of
care 5 and by others a "high" degree of care.'" Shooting a firearm in
a public street is obviously an act likely to produce injury. In Conradt v.
Clauve' the court held the defendant negligent where he permitted a
target range to be operated on a fairgrounds. In Combs v. Thompsoni'
the court declared that the discharge of a toy cannon in the street of the
most populous city in the state was a reckless act. In Askay v.
Maloney,'9 where the officer was lawfully engaged in pursuing a felon,
the court said that he was under a duty to use care commensurate with
the danger involved, in discharging firearms in a public street, but that
whether such degree of care was exercised or not was a question for the
jury to decide. Where, as in the principal case, the shooting was wrong-
ful in itself, it would seem that the defendant was obviously negligent
in shooting in a public street for no better reason than to frighten an
escaping misdemeanant. F.A. R.
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - LIABILITY FOR FRIGHT
Plaintiff, a woman about fifty years old, was a passenger on defend-
ant's bus. When leaving the bus, the folding doors at the rear closed
and caught her, holding her for from thirty seconds to two minutes.
She was not bruised and suffered no apparent physical injury. Plaintiff
introduced evidence to show fright and shock resulting in mental and
(1923); People v. Kline, 305 Ill. 14, 137 N.E. 145 (922)i Pales v. Paoli, 5 F. (2d)
280 (ist. Cir. Ct. App. 1925).
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